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Abstract
The XRP Ledger Consensus Protocol is a previously developed con-
sensus protocol powering the XRP Ledger. It is a low-latency Byzantine
agreement protocol, capable of reaching consensus without full agreement
on which nodes are members of the network. We present a detailed expla-
nation of the algorithm and derive conditions for its safety and liveness.
1 Introduction
The XRP Ledger is a distributed payment system enabling users to transfer
value seamlessly around the world. Operating within a distributed peer-to-peer
network, the XRP Ledger faces the same challenges as other digital currencies
in preventing double-spending of funds and ensuring network-wide consensus on
the state of user accounts and balances. First proposed and then implemented
by Schwartz et al. [10], the algorithm underlying XRP solves these problems
using a Byzantine fault tolerant agreement protocol over collectively trusted
subnetworks, hereby referred to as the XRP Ledger Consensus Protocol, or
XRP LCP for short.
Abstractly, the XRP Ledger network is a replicated state machine [9]. The
replicated state is the ledger maintained by each node in the network and state
transitions correspond to transactions submitted by clients of the network. Once
nodes agree on sets of transactions to apply to the state, a transaction processing
protocol specifies deterministic rules for ordering transactions within each set
and how to apply transactions to generate the new ledger state. Thus, the role of
XRP LCP is only to make the network reach agreement on sets of transactions,
not on the content or outcome of those transactions. As long as nodes agree
on a transaction set, the transaction processing protocol guarantees that every
node generates a consistent ledger. As a Byzantine fault tolerant protocol, XRP
LCP must operate even in the presence of faulty or malicious participants.
Byzantine fault tolerant consensus protocols have a rich history, but most
require preexisting agreement on the protocol participants [8, 3]. The distin-
guishing characteristic of XRP LCP is that it guarantees consistency with only
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partial agreement on who participates, allowing a decentralized open network.
Compared to other decentralized consensus algorithms like proof-of-work [7] or
proof-of-stake [2], XRP LCP has since its inception provided lower transaction
latency and higher throughput for its users. However, without uniform agree-
ment on the network participants, users still need a way to determine whether
their choice of network peers will lead to a consistent network state. In this
setting, each user individually defines a unique node list or UNL, which is
the set of nodes whose messages it will listen to when making decisions about
the network state. It is the intersection of any pair of correct nodes’ UNLs that
determines network safety. As described in the original whitepaper [10], the
minimum overlap requirement was originally believed to be roughly 20% of the
UNL. An independent analysis later suggested the correct bound was instead
roughly > 40% [1].
Given this confusion, our goal in this work is to give a clear and detailed
explanation of XRP LCP and derive the necessary conditions on UNL overlap
for consistency and liveness. We will not discuss the transactional semantics
of XRP’s ledger or XRP’s benefits as a digital currency, but instead view the
algorithm as a general consensus protocol. We re-evaluate the two prior overlap
results and provide a single corrected bound which is partway between the
bounds of [10] and [1]. We also show that under a more general fault model which
was not considered in the original whitepaper but is canonically used in the
research literature, the minimum overlap is actually roughly > 90% of the UNL.
Finally, we show that during the present stages of diversifying trusted network
operators [12], the XRP network is both safe and cannot become “stuck” making
no forward progress.
This research provides a definitive result about the safety of XRP Ledger in
its current state. However, to encourage greater flexibility in choosing UNLs in
the future, we would prefer an algorithm that gets closer to the original expected
overlap bounds. In a sibling paper [6], we present a novel alternative consensus
algorithm called Cobalt that lowers the overlap bound to only > 60% in the
general fault model, cannot get stuck in any network that satisfies the overlap
bound, and has several other properties that make it suitable for eventually
replacing XRP LCP. This paper thus serves primarily to show that the XRP
Ledger is safe in the interim while transitioning to Cobalt, and the relatively
strict requirements on UNL configurations under XRP LCP should be viewed
in light of this planned transition.
Section 2 defines the network model and defines the consensus problem. Sec-
tion 3 is a detailed description of the Ripple consensus algorithm. In section 4,
we prove the network conditions needed to guarantee correctness of the algo-
rithm. Finally, section 5 concludes with a discussion of the results and directions
for improvement.
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2 Network Model and Problem Definition
Let Pi be a node in the network with unique identifier i, such as a cryptographic
public key. Each node Pi is free to choose a unique node list UNLi, which is
the set of nodes (possibly including itself) whose messages Pi will listen to as
part of the XRP LCP. The UNL represents a subset of the network which, when
taken collectively, is trusted by Pi to not collude in an attempt to defraud the
network (see [10] for the motivation of this name). The UNLs give structure to
the network, with a node that is present in more UNLs implicitly having more
influence. An individual node has complete discretion in the choice of their
UNL, although we show in section 4 that minimum overlap with other UNLs
is necessary for consistency and liveness with other honest nodes. We do not
assume that trust is symmetric, so for instance there may be a node Pj ∈ UNLi
such that Pi /∈ UNLj . Figure 1 shows an example trust network.
A node that is not crashed and behaves exactly according to the XRP LCP
specification is said to be honest or correct; we use the two terms inter-
changeably. Any node that does not behave according to protocol is said to
be Byzantine. Byzantine behavior can include not responding to messages,
sending incorrect messages, and even sending different messages to different
parties. In section 4, we initially consider a restriction on the adversary called
Byzantine accountability, which states that all nodes – even Byzantine ones
– cannot send different messages to different nodes. This was part of the original
whitepaper [10], which assumed such behavior in a peer-to-peer network could
be identified and corrected by honest nodes. However, due to asynchrony and
the possibility of honest nodes being temporarily partitioned, this assumption
is in practice tenuous at best. Thus the bulk of our results do not depend on
this assumption and we will clearly state when it is assumed.
For any node Pi, we denote ni = |UNLi| and define the quorum, denoted
qi, a parameter which roughly specifies the minimum number of agreeing nodes
in UNLi that Pi needs to hear from to commit to a decision. Each node sets qi
to be 80% of its UNL size, or, more exactly, qi = ⌈0.8ni⌉. We assume at most
ti 6 ni − qi nodes in UNLi may be Byzantine faulty.
Let L represent a ledger, which is the shared state of the system and includes
account settings, balances, order books, etc. Two ledgers L,L′ are the same if
they represent the same ordered history of transactions starting from the unique
genesis ledger. Each ledger also has sequence number seq(L) that is one greater
than its parent ledger’s sequence number. The genesis ledger has seq(L) = 1.
A ledger L is created by applying a sequence of transactions T = [x0, x1, . . .]
to its parent parent(L) according to the protocol rules. Two ledgers may have
the same parent ledger and sequence number, but differ because they applied
different transactions. Note though that the protocol specifies that every set of
transactions has a deterministic ordering, so it is not possible for two correct
nodes to apply the same transactions but in a different order.
The nodes communicate over a peer-to-peer network which has no prescribed
relation with the UNL structure. We simply assume that for every node Pi and
every node Pj ∈ UNLi, there is a reliable authenticated channel for Pi to receive
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Figure 1: Example trust graph. The highlighted edges represent the UNL of
node Pi.
messages from Pj . To implement such an authenticated channel, all messages
are cryptographically signed and verified by receivers. Each node uses a single
communication primitive broadcast, which when called from node Pj sends
the same message to all nodes Pi for which Pj ∈ UNLi. In the algorithms
presented in appendix A, we use a corresponding receive primitive which is
called asynchronously upon the receipt of a broadcast message.
The outcome of XRP LCP is for a node to fully validate ledgers. A fully
validated ledger is irrevocable and authoritative, and reflects transactions sub-
mitted by network clients and accepted by the consensus algorithm. Fully vali-
dating a ledger also fully validates all of its ancestors. In this context, a fork is
a situation in which two honest nodes fully validate contradictory ledgers, i.e.,
different ledgers with the same sequence number. The network is said to be
fork-safe if it can never fork with a tolerated configuration of Byzantine nodes.
Although XRP LCP is typically defined in terms of the fully validated chain
of ledgers, since each ledger in the chain represents a deterministically-ordered
sequence of transactions it also can be considered as an atomic broadcast pro-
tocol with batching of transactions for efficiency. Formally, an atomic broadcast
protocol is an algorithm in which a set of clients, arbitrarily many of which may
be Byzantine faulty, can broadcast transactions, and each node can accept
some of those transactions according to the following properties:
1. ABC-Agreement: If a correct node accepts a transaction into a ledger,
then eventually all correct nodes accept the transaction into a ledger.
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2. ABC-Linearizability: If a correct node accepts transaction x before trans-
action x′, then all correct nodes accept transaction x before x′.
3. ABC-Censorship-Resilience: If a correct client broadcasts a valid transac-
tion x to all correct nodes, x will eventually be accepted by all nodes.
An atomic broadcast algorithm is in particular a variant of consensus [4].
Note that Censorship Resilience is the formalized definition of forward progress.
In practice, the peer-to-peer network weakens the requirement that clients sub-
mit their transaction to all correct nodes, since correct nodes will echo a sub-
mitted transaction to each other, flooding the network until every node receives
it.
In order to evaluate the correctness of XRP LCP, we model the peer-to-
peer network as if it were controlled by a network adversary that can behave
arbitrarily. The adversary is controls the delivery order of all messages, as well
as at most ti nodes in UNLi for any correct node Pi. We assume though that
the adversary is computationally bounded; in particular, it is unable to break
generally accepted cryptographic protocols. The identities of Byzantine nodes
are unknown in advance by honest nodes in the network.
Since atomic broadcast is a variant of consensus, by the FLP result [5] we
cannot guarantee forward progress in the presence of arbitrary asynchrony and
faulty nodes. Instead, we assume a form of “weak asynchrony”: safety should
hold under arbitrary asynchrony, but censorship resilience is only guaranteed to
hold under the assumption that the network is eventually civil, meaning that
messages are delivered within some protocol-specified maximum delay bound
and no nodes are faulty.
In order to help enforce the bounded delay in the XRP ledger implemen-
tation, several heuristics are used to identify lagging nodes, prevent excessive
flooding of messages and route traffic through the network. Protocol parameters
also define maximum delays on different trusted messages in an attempt to aid
liveness. Although we ignore these details to simplify the presentation below, we
stress that they are important practical considerations in the actual implemen-
tation and control the real world performance of the algorithm. The fact that
XRP LCP is only weakly asynchronous and its performance depends on these
parameters is a limitation of the algorithm. Cobalt, the proposed alternative
algorithm to XRP LCP, does not have these limitations. It uses cryptographic
randomness to evade the FLP result and guarantees forward progress even with
the maximal number of tolerated faulty nodes and unbounded asynchrony [6].
Table 1 summarizes our notation, including some that will be explained in
subsequent sections.
3 The XRP Ledger Consensus Protocol
The XRP Ledger Consensus Protocol consists of three primary components:
• Deliberation, in which nodes iteratively propose a transaction set to
apply to a prior ledger, based on proposals received from other trusted
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Pi A node in the network
UNLi The unique node list (UNL) selected by Pi
ni, qi, ti The size, validation quorum and maximum
Byzantine faults of UNLi
L A ledger
seq(L) Sequence number of ledger L
Lˆ Fully validated ledger with largest sequence
number (the fully validated tip ledger)
L˜ Current working ledger of deliberation
T = {x0, x1, . . .} A set of transactions
PT,r,L,i Node Pi’s r-th deliberation proposal of
transactions T to apply to L
VL,i Node Pi’s validation of ledger L
supptip(L), suppbranch(L) Tip and branch support of a ledger L
uncommitted(s) Uncommitted support at sequence number s
φ(L,L′) Ordering function that is 1 if L > L′ (by hash)
and 0 otherwise
Table 1: Summary of notation
nodes. When a node believes enough proposals agree, it applies the corre-
sponding transactions to the prior ledger according to the ledger protocol
rules. It then issues a validation for the generated ledger.
• Validation, in which nodes decide whether to fully validate a ledger,
based on the validations issued by trusted nodes. Once a quorum of val-
idations for the same ledger is reached, that ledger and its ancestors are
deemed fully validated and its state is authoritative and irrevocable.
• Preferred Branch, in which nodes determine the preferred working
branch of ledger history. In times of asynchrony, network difficulty, or
Byzantine failure, nodes may not initially validate the same ledger for a
given sequence number. In order to make forward progress and fully vali-
date later ledgers, nodes use the ledger ancestry of trusted validations to
resume deliberating on the network’s preferred ledger.
In short, for each sequence number s, each peer Pi issues a validation VL,i
for the ledger L with s = seq(L) that it expects will be fully validated by
validation. Under civil executions, the deliberation process makes it highly
likely the validated ledger will match the ledger validated by its trusted peers.
In cases when the network is not working normally, preferred branch ensures
peers select a common branch such that nodes will later fully validate the same
ledger L′ with seq(L′) > s. This two-step sequence of deliberation and validation
is similar to the proof of stake finality gadget recently introduced by Buterin and
Griffith [2]. Indeed, the preferred branch protocol shares a common principle
with the GHOST rule of Sompolinsky and Zohar [11].
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Lˆ L˜ apply(T, L˜)
L′
Validation Preferred Branch Deliberation
seq(L) s s+ 1 s+ 2 s+ 3
Figure 2: Components of XRP LCP. Each rounded rectangle is a ledger with
an arrow pointing to its parent.
Figure 2 is a schematic view of ledger history and shows how these compo-
nents interact to advance the ledger state from the perspective of a single node.
Time flows to the right, with the two grey ledgers on the left defining the fully
validated and authoritative ledger chain with tip ledger Lˆ. The dashed ledger
on the right represents the deliberation frontier, in which the node is currently
negotiating with its trusted nodes on which transactions to apply towards the
next ledger. The unfilled ledgers represent two conflicting ledgers L˜, L′ that have
been validated by different nodes, but which have not received a quorum to fully
validate. In this schematic, preferred branch determined the upper ledger L˜ is
most likely to be fully validated, so that is the working parent ledger for this
node’s active deliberation round.
3.1 Deliberation
Deliberation is the component of Ripple consensus in which nodes attempt to
agree on the set of transactions to apply towards ledgers they validate. Clients
submit transactions to one or more nodes in the network, who in turn broadcast
the transaction to the rest of the network. Each node maintains a set of these
pending transactions that have not been included in a ledger. Starting from
this set, a node iteratively proposes new transaction sets based on the support
of individual transactions among the sets proposed by nodes in its UNL. Each
proposal PT,r,L,i is a tuple of
• T , the proposing node’s current guess of the consensus transaction set.
• r, the round number of this proposal relative to the other proposals from
Pi based on prior ledger L.
• L, the prior ledger these transactions will apply to.
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start update update update
P0,i P1,i P2,i
P0,k
P0,j
P1,k
P1,j P2,j
apply Vi
Figure 3: Overview of deliberation from the perspective of Pi. The diamonds are
proposals or validations, with all but the deliberation round and node identifier
subscripts removed for brevity.
• i, the identifier of the node Pi that broadcasts this proposal.
When enough nodes in its UNL propose the same transaction set, a node issues
a validation based on that set and begins the next round of deliberation.
Figure 3 is a high-level overview of deliberation, presented formally in algo-
rithm 1. A node initially calls start to begin a new deliberation round and
propose its initial view of the consensus transactions. It asynchronously pro-
cesses new proposals from trusted nodes, maintaining the set of most recent
proposals from each. Proposals are only considered if they are for the same
prior ledger L˜. The node regularly updates its proposed consensus transaction
set in response to newly received node proposals, only including transactions
present in at least threshold(r) of the most recently received proposals from its
trusted nodes. The threshold starts as a simple majority of the nodes in the
UNL, but ratchets up as deliberation rounds proceed. This ensures slow nodes
can’t prevent consensus converging. In the XRP Ledger implementation, the
threshold goes 0.5→ 0.65→ 0.70→ 0.95 as r increases. Each node Pi declares
consensus reached when it sees the quorum qi of its trusted nodes agree on the
transaction set. It then applies the consensus transactions to generate the next
ledger L, broadcasts its validation VL,i and begins a new round of deliberation.
It is important to note that a node may only validate one ledger with a given
sequence number. In fact, the invariant is for node Pi to only issue a validation
VL,i for a ledger L if seq(L) is greater than that of any ledger previously validated
by Pi. Thus if during deliberation, a node determines it is not working on the
preferred branch, it will switch to work on the preferred ledger but will not issue
a validation until it has caught back up to the sequence number it was on before
switching.
In the XRP Ledger implementation of deliberation, protocol timing param-
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eters determine the synchronization requirements of node proposals and con-
ditions for ending deliberation. Additional waiting periods between phases of
deliberation balance the throughput and latency of transaction processing as
well as the network overhead of broadcasting proposals and transaction sets.
There are also protocol rules that determine which transactions are in the ini-
tial proposal and how transactions that failed to be included are retried in
subsequent deliberations. Although this deviates from the abstract algorithm
presented in this paper, we believe the changes only obscure the presentation of
the algorithm and can be viewed as an optimization for increasing transaction
throughput. Most importantly, the safety and liveness results in section 4 do
not depend on these details of deliberation.
3.2 Validation
Validation is the simplest of the three components and is summarized in algo-
rithm 2. Nodes in the network simply listen for validations from trusted nodes.
If a node Pi sees a quorum qi of validations for a ledger L, then it sets the new
fully validated tip ledger Lˆ to L.
3.3 Preferred Branch
Validators normally validate a simple chain of ledgers, e.g. LA → LB → LC . . ..
However, during times of asynchrony, network difficulty, or temporary Byzantine
failure during deliberation, not all correct nodes may end up receiving enough
validations for any individual ledger to fully validate. When presented with con-
flicting ledgers, preferred branch is the strategy which determines the preferred
chain of ledgers to switch to in order to continue making forward progress. It
is based on the shared ancestry of the most recent validated ledgers, lastV als,
and the following quantities:
1. The tip support of a ledger L, which is the number of trusted nodes
whose most recent validated ledger is L,
supptip(L) = |{VL′,i ∈ lastV als : L = L
′}|. (1)
2. The branch support of a ledger L, which is the number of trusted nodes
whose most recently validated ledger is either L or is descended from L,
suppbranch(L) = supptip(L) + |{VL′,i ∈ lastV als : L ∈ ancestors(L
′)}|,
(2)
where ancestors(L′) is the set of ancestors of L′, i.e. the parent, grand-
parent, great-grandparent, etc., all the way back to the genesis ledger.
3. The uncommitted support on a sequence number s, which is the num-
ber of trusted nodes whose most recent validated ledger is for a ledger
with either sequence lower than s or with sequence lower than that of the
largest ledger L validation that we personally have broadcasted:
uncommitted(s) = |{VL′,i ∈ lastV als : seq(L
′) < max(s, seq(L)). (3)
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LA :
(0, 5, 0)
LB :
(1, 3, 0)
LD :
(1, 2, 1)
LE :
(1, 1, 4)
LC :
(0, 2, 0)
LF :
(2, 2, 1)
Figure 4: Ledger ancestry annotated with tuple of supptip,suppbranch, and
uncommitted) from the perspective of the node that last validated LF . Ledger
LD is preferred.
Figure 4 shows a motivating example, where each ledger is annotated with
the tuple of (supptip, suppbranch, uncommitted) from the perspective of a node
that last validated LF . There are 5 trusted nodes, two that last validated
LF and one each validating LB, LD and LE . The preferred branch strategy
determines that LD is preferred.
The preferred branch protocol is provided in Algorithm 3. Intuitively, the
idea is for each node to be conservative and only switch to a different branch
when it knows enough nodes have committed to that chain of ledgers such that
an alternative chain cannot have more support. The preferred ledger is found
by walking the ancestry tree, starting from the ledger L that is the common
ancestor ledger of the most recently validated ledgers. We then select the child
ledger L′ ∈ children(L) with highest suppbranch(L
′), that would still have the
most support even if all uncommitted(seq(L′)) picked a conflicting sibling ledger.
If we cannot select a child of L satisfying this requirement, then L is the preferred
ledger. If we can find a preferred child L′, then we repeat the process on the
children of L′. In order to ensure a total ordering on ledgers and break ties
between sibling ledgers, we rely on a function φ(L′, L′′), which is 1 if the hash
of L′ > L′′ and is 0 otherwise. If the ledger found is an ancestor of our current
working ledger L˜, we keep L˜ is the preferred ledger, since we do not yet know
we are on the wrong branch.
Note that in cases of extreme asynchrony, a branch may only be initially
supported by a single node when it becomes preferred. That means other nodes
must verify the protocol invariants of that ledger before switching to deliberate
on it.
4 Analysis
Having described the XRP LCP from a protocol perspective, we now formally
prove results about its safety and liveness.
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4.1 Safety
In this section we will prove conditions on the network configuration that guar-
antee different nodes running the XRP LCP will remain consistent.
In the following analysis, we find it convenient to assume that fully validating
a ledger does not fully validate its ancestors. As we will find, it turns that it may
be possible in some configurations for two nodes to fully validate contradictory
ledgers with different sequence numbers even if fully validating contradictory
ledgers with the same sequence number is impossible. The former is just as
problematic as the latter, but we find it convenient to separate out the two
failure types and prove conditions preventing them separately.
For the initial analysis, we make a simplifying assumption. Later in the paper
we will reanalyze the problem without these assumptions. The assumption
we make is that a Byzantine faulty node cannot convince two honest nodes
that it validated different ledgers. This assumption was used in the original
whitepaper [10] and is rationalized by the idea that all communication is done
through generic multicast over a peer-to-peer network, so that the “echoes”
of two contradictory messages would be noticed in time for the message to be
ignored, since the messages are signed. Unfortunately this assumption does not
hold in a fully asynchronous network, since a network partition could segregate
the contradictory messages long enough for damage to occur. We call this
assumption Byzantine accountability, and will always reference when we are
using it as an assumption.
Assuming Byzantine accountability holds, we now analyze when it is possible
for two nodes to fully validate different ledgers in a single round of consensus.
Modifying the notation slightly, the condition suggested in the whitepaper [10]
was that two nodes Pi,Pj cannot fully validate conflicting ledgers if
|UNLi ∩ UNLj | > max{ni − qi, nj − qj}.
With quorums of 80% as suggested, this condition is more easily identified with
the actual condition given in the whitepaper,
|UNLi ∩ UNLj | > 0.2max{ni, nj}.
In a later independent analysis, Armknecht et al. [1] showed that this condi-
tion is incorrect. They instead suggest that Pi,Pj cannot fully validate different
ledgers if and only if
|UNLi ∩ UNLj | > 2max{ni − qi, nj − qj}.
It is true that if the above condition holds then Pi and Pj cannot fully validate
different ledgers. However, the converse is not true as the following proposition
shows.
Proposition 1. Assuming Byzantine accountability, two honest nodes Pi,Pj
cannot fully validate different ledgers with the same sequence number iff
|UNLi ∩ UNLj | > ni − qi + nj − qj .
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Note that 2max{ni − qi, nj − qj} > ni − qi + nj − qj , but ni − qi + nj − qj
is strictly smaller whenever ni − qi 6= nj − qj . Thus the condition suggested by
Armknecht et al. is sufficient but not necessary.
Proof of proposition 1. We first prove sufficiency. Suppose Pi fully validates the
ledger L and |UNLi ∩ UNLj | > ni − qi + nj − qj .
Let S be the set of nodes in UNLi that validated L. Since Pi fully validated
L, |S| > qi. By Byzantine accountability, every node in S ∩ UNLj could not
have sent a validation to Pj for any ledger L
′ 6= L. Thus it suffices to show
that |S ∩ UNLj | > nj − qj , since then there cannot be any ledger L
′ 6= L with
qj support in UNLj .
By the overlap hypothesis, we have
|S ∩ UNLj | = |S| − |S \ UNLj |
> |S| − |UNLi \ UNLj |
= |S| − (|UNLi| − |UNLi ∩ UNLj |)
> |S| − (ni − (ni − qi + nj − qj))
> qi − (ni − (ni − qi + nj − qj))
= nj − qj .
For necessity, first suppose |UNLi ∩ UNLj | 6 nj − qj . Then all the nodes in
UNLi can validate L, while all the nodes in UNLj \ UNLi validate L
′, and by
assumption |UNLj \ UNLi| > qj so Pj fully validates L
′ while Pi fully validates
L.
Now suppose |UNLi∩UNLj | 6 ni− qi+nj− qj and |UNLi∩UNLj | > nj− qj .
Then
|UNLi \ UNLj| = |UNLi| − |UNLi ∩ UNLj|
> ni − (ni − qi + nj − qj)
= qi + qj − nj.
Thus if all nodes in UNLi \UNLj validate L and nj−qj nodes in UNLi∩UNLj
also validate L (which is possible since |UNLi∩UNLj | > nj−qj by assumption),
then Pi will receive (qi + qj − nj) + (nj − qj) = qi validations for L and fully
validate L. Meanwhile, if all the other nodes in UNLj validate L
′, then since
only nj − qj nodes in UNLj validated L, nj − (nj − qj) = qj nodes will validate
L′, so Pj will fully validate L
′.
Assuming a quorum of 80%, these overlap conditions may be summarized
as follows:
• Schwartz et al.: Every pair of nodes needs an overlap of 20% the maximum
size of their respective UNLs.
• Armknecht et al.: Every pair of nodes needs an overlap of 41% the maxi-
mum size of their respective UNLs.
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• Actual condition: Every pair of nodes needs an overlap of 41% of the
average size of their respective UNLs.
For the remainder of the paper we will no longer assume Byzantine account-
ability. In a live network, one would prefer absolute safety rather than relying
on brittle heuristics that suggest it is unlikely that a Byzantine node could send
conflicting messages to different nodes without getting caught. Thus we follow
the research convention and assume that Byzantine nodes can send arbitrary
messages to arbitrary nodes.
For any pair of nodes Pi and Pj , let Oi,j = |UNLi ∩ UNLj | and let ti,j =
min{ti, tj ,Oi,j}. ti,j is the maximum number of allowed Byzantine faults in
UNLi ∩UNLj , assuming that there are at most ti faults in UNLi and at most tj
faults in UNLj .
The following lemma will be useful throughout the paper.
Lemma 2. If an honest node Pi sees m validations for the ledger L with
seq(L) = s, then for any other honest node Pj, there are at least Oi,j+m−ni−ti,j
honest nodes in UNLj that validated L. Furthermore, there can be exactly
Oi,j +m− ni − ti,j honest nodes in UNLj that validated L.
Corollary 3. If an honest node Pi sees m validations for the ledger L with
seq(L) = s, then Pj can see at most ni + nj − Oi,j −m + ti,j validations for
any contradictory ledger L′ with seq(L′) = s. Furthermore, it is possible for Pj
to see exactly ni + nj −Oi,j −m+ ti,j validations for a contradictory ledger L
′
with sequence number s.
Proof. If an honest node validates L, then Pj cannot receive a validation for any
contradictory ledger L′ from it. By lemma 2, there are at least Oi,j+m−ni−ti,j
honest nodes that validate L. If every other node in UNLj sends a validation to
Pj for some contradictory ledger L
′, then Pj can receive up to (and including,
by the secondary clause of lemma 2)
nj − (Oi,j +m− ni − ti,j) = ni + nj − Oi,j −m+ ti,j
validations for L′ with seq(L′) = s.
Note that corollary 3 does not preclude the possibility that Pj will see more
than ni+nj−Oi,j −m+ ti,j validations for a contradictory ledger with a larger
sequence number than s. Indeed, without assuming totality, it turns out that
such an occurrence is possible, which forces the algorithm to use much tighter
safety margins.
Proof of lemma 2. The proof is similar to the proof of proposition 1.
Suppose Pi sees m validations for L. Again letting S be the set of nodes in
UNLi that sent validations to Pi for L, then
|S ∩ UNLj | = |S| − |S \ UNLj |
> |S| − |UNLi \ UNLj |
= |S| − (ni − Oi,j)
= m− ni + Oi,j .
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There could be ti,j Byzantine nodes in S ∩ UNLj that send Pj a validation
for something other than L, so at leastm−ni+Oi,j−ti,j honest nodes validated
L.
For the second point, assume that every node in UNLi \ UNLj validates L,
ti,j Byzantine nodes in UNLi ∩UNLj send a validation for L to Pi and L
′ to Pj .
Then there are exactly m − ni + Oi,j − ti,j honest nodes in UNLi ∩ UNLj that
send a validation for L to Pj . Since every node in UNLj \ UNLi can validate
some ledger other than L, there can be exactly m−ni+Oi,j − ti,j honest nodes
in UNLj that send a validation for L to Pj.
Proposition 4. Pi fully validating some ledger L with seq(L) = s implies that
Pj cannot fully validate any contradictory ledger with the same sequence number
s iff Oi,j > (ni − qi) + (nj − qj) + ti,j .
Proof. By letting m = qi, corollary 3 tells us that Pi fully validating L implies
that Pj can see at most ni+nj−Oi,j−qi+ ti,j validations for any contradictory
ledger with sequence number s.
Thus if
qj > ni + nj − Oi,j − qi + ti,j
Oi,j > ni − qi + nj − qj + ti,j
then Pj cannot fully validate any contradictory ledger with seqeuence number
s.
For necessity, if Oi,j 6 (ni − qi) + (nj − qj) + ti,j , then the second clause of
corollary 3 implies that Pj can see exactly
ni + nj − Oi,j − qi + ti,j > ni + nj − ((ni − qi) + (nj − qj) + ti,j)− qi + ti,j
= qj
validations for a contradictory ledger L′, allowing Pj to fully validate L
′.
Once again assuming 80% quorums and 20% fault tolerance as in the
whitepaper, this overlap condition can be summarized as requiring roughly 61%
UNL overlaps.
To see why the overlap hypothesis in proposition 4 does not guarantee full
safety, note that it is possible for a node to exit from deliberation for sequence s
and then be unable to fully validate any ledger with sequence s, as the following
example shows.
Example 5.
Consider a complete network with 10 nodes. Let X denote the first 5 nodes
and Y denote the other 5 nodes. As shown in figure 5, suppose all the nodes inX
begin deliberation proposing the transaction set T = {x0, x1} and all the nodes
in Y begin deliberation proposing the set T ′ = {x0}. Thus for a transaction
threshold of τ , receiving τ proposals for T will cause an honest node to propose
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X Y
Z
Z ′
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
T T T T T T ′ T ′ T ′ T ′ T ′
x0 : 100%
x1 : 50%
x0 : 100%
x1 : 40%
Round,threshold
r − 1, 50%
T T T T T T ′ T ′ T ′ T ′ T ′
x0 : 100%
x1 : 50%
x0 : 100%
x1 : 50%r, 50%
T T T T T T T T T T
x0 : 100%
x1 : 50%
x0 : 100%
x1 : 60%r + 1, 65%
T ′ T ′ T ′ T ′ T ′ T ′ T ′ T ′ T ′ T ′
r + 2, 65%
Figure 5: Schematic of example 5. The two node groups X and Y begin by
proposing T = {x0, x1} and T
′ = {x0} respectively. The left (right) boxes
reflect proposals seen by node 1 (10) and are representive of all nodes in group
X (Y ). Gray arrows indicate proposals that were received in time to calculate
the thresholds for a given round. Note that in round r − 1, the proposal from
node 5 was not received by nodes in Y . The two partitions Z and Z ′ are
represented by the dashed boxes. Note that all nodes share the same single
UNL.
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T , while receiving less that τ proposals for T but τ proposals for either T or T ′
will cause an honest node to propose T ′, since T ∩ T ′ = T ′.
Let r be such that the transaction threshold is 50% in deliberation round
r and 65% in round r + 1. By the ratcheting threshold protocol described in
subsection 3.1, such an r exists. During the first r − 1 rounds, the nodes in X
receive all the proposals, while the nodes in Y receive all the proposals except
for one proposal from a node in X . Since the nodes in X propose T while the
nodes in Y propose T ′, the nodes in X continue proposing T , while the nodes in
Y only receive 4 proposals for T and continue proposing T ′ by the assumptions
on T and T ′.
Now in round r all nodes receive all proposals. This causes all nodes to
propose T in round r + 1. But in round r + 1, a network failure causes none
of the nodes to receive anyone else’s proposals. Based on the most recently
received deliberation proposals, everyone assumes that all the other nodes are
still proposing what they proposed in the previous round. Thus the nodes in X
see only 5 proposals for T while the nodes in Y see only 6 proposals for T (since
they of course receive their own updated proposals). No one sees 65% support
for x1, but everyone sees 100% support for x0, so everyone proposes T
′ in round
r + 2.
Now pick an arbitrary partition of the network into two sets, Z and Z ′. The
nodes in Z receive all the proposals from round r+1 but none of the proposals
from round r+2. Thus they see 100% support for T and validate T . Meanwhile
the nodes in Z ′ receive all the proposals from round k + 2, see 100% support
for T ′, and validate T ′. Thus we can exit from deliberation with two arbitrary
subsets validating different ledgers. In this case if |Z| > 2 and |Z ′| > 2, then
none of the nodes will fully validate a ledger during this consensus round.
Because of examples like example 5, we therefore make the broad assumption
that deliberation can terminate with an arbitrary result. In practice, this may
require a significantly degraded network, but is nonetheless a real risk. From
a theoretical perspective, deliberation is therefore completely irrelevant; it is
purely an optimization that makes it so that during civil executions most nodes
will go into validation with the same ledger, allowing every node to fully validate
usually, and it could be removed without fundamentally changing the protocol.
Thus we shift our focus towards validation without making any assumptions
about the result of deliberation. We need to prove that if any node fully validates
a ledger L, then it is never possible for a node to fully validate a ledger L′ such
that seq(L′) > seq(L) and L′ is not a descendant of L. The following lemma
provides the route for guaranteeing this.
Lemma 6. If for every node Pi, there are more than ni/2 honest nodes in UNLi
that submit a validation for some ledger L with seq(L), then for every node Pi
more than ni/2 honest nodes in UNLi will always submit validations for ledgers
descended from L.
Proof. We prove this by contradiction. If the lemma is not true, then under the
lemma’s hypotheses there must be some honest node which submits a validation
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for L and also eventually submits a validation for some ledger L′ with seq(L′) >
seq(L) and L′ not descended from L. Since correct nodes can only submit new
validations for ledgers with sequence strictly greater than any ledger they have
previously submitted a validation for, such a node must submit its validation for
L′ after having submitted its validation for L. Thus let Pi be the honest node
that submitted a validation for L and later is the first to submit a validation
for a ledger L′ not descended from L.
The only way for Pi to later submit a validation for a ledger off of the L
branch is if it runs the preferred branch algorithm and sees a ledger off the L
branch as preferred. For a given s 6 seq(L), let parent(s, L) denote the ancestor
of L with sequence s. Since Pi submitted a validation for L by assumption, it
considers all validations for ledgers with sequence below seq(L) as uncommitted
in the preferred branch protocol. But since Pi is assumed to be the first to
switch away from the L branch, more than ni/2 nodes in UNLi cannot have
sent out a validation for any ledger L′ with seq(L′) > s and L′ not descended
from L. Thus for every s 6 seq(L), Pi sees a majority of nodes in UNLi as being
either uncommitted support at s or branch support for parent(s, L). In other
words, for all s 6 seq(L),
suppbranch(parent(s, L)) > ni/2− uncommitted(s).
For a given s < seq(L), suppose parent(s, L) is the current base ledger in the
loop on line 10 of Algorithm 3. Then either C[0] = parent(s + 1, L) or there is
some L′ 6= parent(s+ 1, L) with parent(L′) = parent(s, L) and C[0] = L′. In the
latter case, the branch support for C[1] must be at least equal to the branch
support for parent(s+ 1, L) (breaking ties with φ) by definition of the ordering
of C. Further, the branch support for C[0] must be less than ni/2. Thus in line
16,
∆ = suppbranch(C[0])− suppbranch(C[1]) + φ(C[0], C[1])
6 suppbranch(C[0])− suppbranch(parent(s+ 1, L)) + 1
< ni/2− suppbranch(parent(s+ 1, L)) + 1
< ni/2− (ni/2− uncommitted(s+ 1)) + 1
6 uncommitted(s+ 1) + 1,
so the condition ∆ > uncommitted(s+1) is always false. Thus in the latter case
Pi sees parent(s, L) as the preferred ledger. In the former case, Pi either sees
parent(s + 1, L) as the preferred ledger or continues the loop with parent(s +
1, L) as the base ledger. By induction, Pi is guaranteed to see some ledger on
the L branch as preferred, so Pi cannot leave the L branch, contradicting our
assumption about Pi.
If more than ni/2 honest nodes in UNLi only ever validate descendants of
L, then certainly Pi cannot fully validate a ledger that doesn’t descend from L,
since otherwise there would be qi > ni/2 nodes that sent validations for some
ledger L′ with sequence number s′ that doesn’t descend from L. Thus we can
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show that consensus is safe if we can guarantee that if any honest node fully
validates a ledger L with sequence number s, then for every node Pi, more than
ni/2 honest nodes in UNLi must have validated L. The following proposition
gives the overlap condition guaranteeing this property.
Proposition 7. Given two honest nodes Pi,Pj, Pi fully validating a ledger L
with seq(L) = s implies that there are more than nj/2 honest nodes in UNLj
which validated L iff Oi,j > nj/2 + ni − qi + ti,j.
Proof. The proof is directly analogous to the proof of proposition 4, except
rather than bounding the formula by qj we bound it by nj/2.
Theorem 8. XRP LCP guarantees fork safety if Oi,j > nj/2+ni− qi+ ti,j for
every pair of nodes Pi,Pj.
Note that although proposition 7 is an iff statement, the overlap condition
in theorem 8 is only sufficient but not necessary for XRP LCP safety. This
is because lemma 6 is not an iff statement. Further, there may be some vali-
dation configurations that cannot come out of deliberation, breaking our broad
assumption that anything can come out of deliberation. However, it is the weak-
est condition that can be expressed purely as a bound on the size of overlaps.
Once again assuming 80% quorums and 20% faults, the overlap condition
in theorem 8 can be summarized as requiring roughly > 90% UNL overlaps.
Although quite a narrow margin (and certainly far more narrow than originally
expected), this does still allow a small amount of variation, which is very impor-
tant for the XRP Ledger network’s transition to a recommended UNL comprised
of independent entities. Having some flexibility in the UNLs is important both
for after the diversification of trusted operators (as one can never guarantee
total agreement on participants when the participants are independent entities)
and also during the diversification process (if tiny disagreements during changes
to the UNL list could cause a fork, then diversification would always be too
risky to execute).
4.2 Liveness
Now that we have a concrete metric of when it is impossible for the network to
fork, we would like to know when it makes forward progress. If a live network
stops making forward progress, that is almost as damaging as forking, since
businesses might be relying on being able to make transfers on time. Unfortu-
nately, by the FLP result [5] it is impossible to guarantee forward progress in a
fully asynchronous network.
In the absence of being able to prove that the network always makes forward
progress, we would like to at least be able to prove that the network cannot get
“stuck”. In other words, that the network cannot get into a state in which some
honest nodes can never fully validate a new ledger.
Unfortunately, it is very difficult in general to guarantee forward progress
with XRP LCP. The following example shows that it is possible to get stuck
even with 99% UNL overlaps and no Byzantine faults.
18
X
Y
1 2 3 . . . 51 52 . . . 100 101 102
L L L
. . .
L L′
. . .
L′ L′ L′
Figure 6: Example of stuck network with 99% UNL overlap and no Byzantine
faults.
Example 9.
Consider a network of 102 peers drawin in figure 6. There are two UNLs,
the red X = {P1,P2, . . . ,P101} and blue Y = {P2,P3, . . . ,P102}. Peers 1 − 51
use X and peers 52 − 102 use Y . There are two ledgers, L and L′. The nodes
listening to X all validate a descendant of L, while the nodes listening to Y all
validate a descendant of L′. Since 51 > 0.5|X | nodes in X validate a descendant
of L. Thus according to the preferred branch protocol all, the nodes listening
to X cannot switch branch to L′. Similarly, since 51 > 0.5|Y | nodes in Y all
validate a descendant of L, the nodes listening to Y cannot switch branch to
L′. The network cannot ever rejoin without manual intervention.
As of the time this paper was written, the recommended XRP trust model
has all nodes listening to either a single UNL consisting of 5 nodes, or a UNL
consisting of those 5 nodes plus one extra node (typically the extra node is one-
self; nodes that listen to these extended UNLs are thus called ”leaves”, since
they branch off slightly from the core network). The short-term plan for de-
centralization involves expanding to a larger, but still agreed-upon, single UNL
and diversifying the node operators. Losing forward progress while adjusting
to a new node list is not a huge problem (since as soon as everyone agrees on
the node list again forward progress will resume, and the previous section guar-
antees for “small” changes it will not fork during the interim); thus we could
at least get a positive result by proving that the network cannot get stuck in a
complete graph with leaves.
The following lemma simplifies the problem to only needing to verify that
complete networks cannot get stuck.
Lemma 10. Suppose N is a closed subset of the network (i.e., the UNL of
every node in N is contained in N , so that from the perspective of the nodes
inside of N , N is the entire network) which cannot get stuck and cannot fork.
Suppose Pi is a node not in N such that UNLi = {Pi}∪N
′, where N ′ ⊆ N and
|N ′| > qi. Then N ∪ {Pi} cannot get stuck either.
Proof. Since N cannot get stuck, it is always true that all the nodes in N will
eventually fully validate a new ledger. Since N cannot fork, all the nodes in N
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can only fully validate the same ledger, so eventually there is some ledger L that
gets fully validated by every node in N . Thus every node in N will validate L,
and since |UNLi ∩ N | = |N
′| > qi, Pi can fully validate L as well. Thus it is
always true that Pi will eventually fully validate a new ledger, so Pi cannot get
stuck.
Theorem 11. Suppose for all nodes the UNL quorum is set to n− ⌊(n− 1)/k⌋
for some integer k. XRP LCP cannot get stuck in a network consisting of a
single agreed-upon UNL X of size at least k along with an arbitrary number of
leaf validators.
Proof. For any leaf validator Pi, ni = |X |+ 1; since qi = |X |+ 1− ⌊(|X |+ 1−
1)/k⌋ = |X |+1−⌊|X |/k⌋ 6 |X |, by lemma 10 it suffices to show that complete
networks cannot get stuck.
Thus suppose there is a single agreed-upon UNLX . Suppose in some round r
all validation messages are delivered quickly enough so that Byzantine account-
ability holds and every node sees every other node’s validations from round r.
Then the preferred branch algorithm will deterministically push all nodes onto
the most popular ledger L. Thus in the next round all nodes will validate a child
of L. If messages sent during deliberation are delivered synchronously, then all
nodes see the same proposals from round 1 and either all exit deliberation with
the same ledger (if some transaction set is shared with 80% of the nodes in X)
or else build their proposal for round 2 deterministically from the same propos-
als from round 1, so all nodes propose the same set of transactions in round 2,
and all nodes leave deliberation with the same set of transactions. Thus every
node submits a validation for the same ledger, and all nodes fully validate that
ledger.
5 Conclusion
We have given a detailed description and thorough analysis of the XRP Ledger
Consensus Protocol, which is a protocol for reaching consensus without universal
agreement of network participants. Our work corrects prior analysis in [10, 1].
We show in theorem 8 that roughly > 90% agreement on participants is needed
to ensure network safety. In the restricted case of a single expanding UNL with
leaves, theorem 11 shows we can always make forward progress during periods
when no nodes are faulty and network messages are delivered with bounded
delay. In the more general case with even minor disagreement of participants,
we cannot guarantee that the network makes forward progress.
It is an open question whether the sufficient overlap condition in theorem
8 can be improved by a more detailed consideration of the trust topology of
the network. A more complicated condition that does not simply take into
account pairwise overlaps but also the way in which messages flow indirectly
through the network might have potential for giving a more precise condition for
guaranteeing safety. Likewise, we might be able to leverage the trust structure
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to better explain cases when deliberation can fail, which in turn might allow a
more refined understanding on forward progress.
Although we have shown that XRP LCP is provably safe with the current
and near-future network structures, in an attempt to alleviate some of its short-
comings, in the sibling paper [6] we present an alternative consensus protocol
called Cobalt. Similar to XRP LCP, Cobalt can also be used in networks that
lack uniform agreement on participants or trust, but makes forward progress at
a steady rate in the presence of maximum tolerated Byzantine faults and arbi-
trary asynchrony. It only needs > 60% overlap to match the XRP LCP safety
tolerances. Cobalt also has several other properties that make it simpler to
analyze the health of networks in practice. For these reasons we believe Cobalt
represents an encouraging direction for even greater future decentralization of
the XRP network.
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A Algorithms
In this appendix, we provide pseudo-code for the three components of Ripple
consensus described in section 3. Note that under the network model in sec-
tion 2, a message which is broadcast by a node Pi is received by all nodes,
including Pi itself.
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Algorithm 1 Deliberation from the perspective of Pi
1: smax ← 0 ⊲ Track the largest validated ledger sequence number
2: function Start(L)
3: L˜← L, r ← 0
4: T ← pending transactions
5: props ← {} ⊲ props is a map from node to proposal
6: Initialize props with previously received proposals for L˜
7: broadcast PT,r,L˜,i
8: end function
9: receive PT ′,r′,L,j do
10: if Pj ∈ UNLi and L˜ = L and r
′ > props[j].r then
11: props[j] = PT ′,r′,L,j
12: end if
13: end receive
14: function Update() ⊲ Called at a regular, protocol defined interval
15: if L˜ 6=PreferredLedger() then
16: start(preferredLedger())
17: else
18: UpdatePosition()
19: if CheckConsensus() then
20: L˜← apply(T, L˜)
21: if seq(L˜) > smax then
22: broadcast VL˜,i
23: smax ← seq(L˜)
24: end if
25: Start(L˜)
26: end if
27: end if
28: end function
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Algorithm 1 Deliberation from the perspective of Pi (continued)
29: function UpdatePosition()
30: Tall ←
⋃
P∈props P.T ⊲ Set of all proposed transactions
31: τ ← threshold(r)ni
32: T ← {x ∈ Tall : support(x) > τ} ⊲ support is number of nodes
proposing x
33: r ← r + 1
34: broadcast PT,r,L˜,i
35: end function
36: function CheckConsensus()
37: na ← |{P ∈ props : P.T = T }| ⊲ Node positions agreeing with our posi-
tion
38: return na ≥ qi
39: end function
Algorithm 2 Validation from the perspective of Pi
1: vals = {} ⊲ vals is a map from L to the set of nodes that validated L
2: receive VL,j do
3: if Pj ∈ UNLi then
4: vals[L]← vals[L] ∪ j
5: if |vals[L]| ≥ qi and seq(L) > seq(Lˆ) then
6: Lˆ← L
7: end if
8: end if
9: end receive
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Algorithm 3 Preferred branch from the perspective of Pi
1: lastV als = {} ⊲ lastV als is a map from trusted node to its most re-
cent validated ledger
2: receive VL,j do
3: if Pj ∈ UNLi then
4: lastV als[j]← L
5: end if
6: end receive
7: function PreferredLedger( )
8: L← earliest common ancestor of ledgers in lastV als
9: done = False
10: while |children(L)| > 0 and not done do
11: C ← Sorted array of children(L) by descreasing suppbranch, break-
ing ties with φ
12: ∆← suppbranchC[0]
13: if |children(L)| > 1 then
14: ∆← ∆− suppbranchC[1] + φ(C[0], C[1])
15: end if
16: if ∆ > uncommitted(seq(L) + 1) then
17: L← C[0]
18: else
19: done← True
20: end if
21: end while
22: if L ∈ ancestors(L˜) then
23: return L˜
24: else
25: return L
26: end if
27: end function
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